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Refer to the scenario. # Introduction to the customer You are helping a company add Aruba ClearPass to their network, which uses Aruba network infrastructure devices. The company currently has a Windows domain and Windows CA. The Window CA issues certificates to domain computers, domain users, and servers such as domain controllers. An example of a certificate issued by the Windows CA is shown here. The company is in the process of adding Microsoft Endpoint Manager (Intune) to manage its mobile clients. The customer is maintaining the on-prem AD for now and uses Azure AD Connect to sync with Azure AD. # Requirements for issuing certificates to mobile clients The company wants to use ClearPass Onboard to deploy certificates automatically to mobile clients enrolled in Intune. During this process, Onboard should communicate with Azure AD to validate the clients. High availability should also be provided for this scenario; in other words, clients should be able to get certificates from Subscriber 2 if Subscriber 1 is down. The Intune admins intend to create certificate profiles that include a UPN SAN with the UPN of the user who enrolled the device. # Requirements for authenticating clients The customer requires all types of clients to connect and authenticate on the same corporate SSID. The company wants CPPM to use these authentication methods: EAP-TLS to authenticate users on mobile clients registered in Intune TEAR, with EAP-TLS as the inner method to authenticate Windows domain computers and the users on them To succeed, EAP-TLS (standalone or as a TEAP method) clients must meet these requirements: Their certificate is valid and is not revoked, as validated by OCSP The client's username matches an account in AD # Requirements for assigning clients to roles After authentication, the customer wants the CPPM to assign clients to ClearPass roles based on the following rules: Clients with certificates issued by Onboard are assigned the "mobile-onboarded" role Clients that have passed TEAP Method 1 are assigned the "domain-computer" role Clients in the AD group "Medical" are assigned the "medical-staff" role Clients in the AD group "Reception" are assigned to the "reception-staff" role The customer requires CPPM to assign authenticated clients to AOS firewall roles as follows: Assign medical staff on mobile-onboarded clients to the "medical-mobile" firewall role Assign other mobile-onboarded clients to the "mobile-other" firewall role Assign medical staff on domain computers to the "medical-domain" firewall role All reception staff on domain computers to the "reception-domain" firewall role All domain computers with no valid user logged in to the "computer-only" firewall role Deny other clients access # Other requirements Communications between ClearPass servers and on-prem AD domain controllers must be encrypted. # Network topology For the network infrastructure, this customer has Aruba APs and Aruba gateways, which are managed by Central. APs use tunneled WLANs, which tunnel traffic to the gateway cluster. The customer also has AOS-CX switches that are not managed by Central at this point. # ClearPass cluster IP addressing and hostnames A customer's ClearPass cluster has these IP addresses: Publisher = 10.47.47.5 Subscriber 1 = 10.47.47.6 Subscriber 2 = 10.47.47.7 Virtual IP with Subscriber 1 and Subscriber 2 = 10.47.47.8 The customer's DNS server has these entries cp.acnsxtest.com = 10.47.47.5 cps1.acnsxtest.com = 10.47.47.6 cps2.acnsxtest.com = 10.47.47.7 radius.acnsxtest.com = 10.47.47.8 onboard.acnsxtest.com = 10.47.47.8 You have imported the root certificate for the Windows CA to the ClearPass CA Trust list. Which usages should you add to it based on the scenario requirements?



Refer to the scenario. # Introduction to the customer You are helping a company add Aruba ClearPass to their network, which uses Aruba network infrastructure devices. The company currently has a Windows domain and Windows CA. The Window CA issues certificates to domain computers, domain users, and servers such as domain controllers. An example of a certificate issued by the Windows CA is shown here. The company is in the process of adding Microsoft Endpoint Manager (Intune) to manage its mobile clients. The customer is maintaining the on-prem AD for now and uses Azure AD Connect to sync with Azure AD. # Requirements for issuing certificates to mobile clients The company wants to use ClearPass Onboard to deploy certificates automatically to mobile clients enrolled in Intune. During this process, Onboard should communicate with Azure AD to validate the clients. High availability should also be provided for this scenario; in other words, clients should be able to get certificates from Subscriber 2 if Subscriber 1 is down. The Intune admins intend to create certificate profiles that include a UPN SAN with the UPN of the user who enrolled the device. # Requirements for authenticating clients The customer requires all types of clients to connect and authenticate on the same corporate SSID. The company wants CPPM to use these authentication methods: EAP-TLS to authenticate users on mobile clients registered in Intune TEAR, with EAP-TLS as the inner method to authenticate Windows domain computers and the users on them To succeed, EAP-TLS (standalone or as a TEAP method) clients must meet these requirements: Their certificate is valid and is not revoked, as validated by OCSP The client's username matches an account in AD # Requirements for assigning clients to roles After authentication, the customer wants the CPPM to assign clients to ClearPass roles based on the following rules: Clients with certificates issued by Onboard are assigned the "mobile-onboarded" role Clients that have passed TEAP Method 1 are assigned the "domain-computer" role Clients in the AD group "Medical" are assigned the "medical-staff" role Clients in the AD group "Reception" are assigned to the "reception-staff" role The customer requires CPPM to assign authenticated clients to AOS firewall roles as follows: Assign medical staff on mobile-onboarded clients to the "medical-mobile" firewall role Assign other mobile-onboarded clients to the "mobile-other" firewall role Assign medical staff on domain computers to the "medical-domain" firewall role All reception staff on domain computers to the "reception-domain" firewall role All domain computers with no valid user logged in to the "computer-only" firewall role Deny other clients access # Other requirements Communications between ClearPass servers and on-prem AD domain controllers must be encrypted. # Network topology For the network infrastructure, this customer has Aruba APs and Aruba gateways, which are managed by Central. APs use tunneled WLANs, which tunnel traffic to the gateway cluster. The customer also has AOS-CX switches that are not managed by Central at this point. # ClearPass cluster IP addressing and hostnames A customer's ClearPass cluster has these IP addresses: Publisher = 10.47.47.5 Subscriber 1 = 10.47.47.6 Subscriber 2 = 10.47.47.7 Virtual IP with Subscriber 1 and Subscriber 2 = 10.47.47.8 The customer's DNS server has these entries cp.acnsxtest.com = 10.47.47.5 cps1.acnsxtest.com = 10.47.47.6 cps2.acnsxtest.com = 10.47.47.7 radius.acnsxtest.com = 10.47.47.8 onboard.acnsxtest.com = 10.47.47.8 You have started to create a CA to meet the customer's requirements for issuing certificates to mobile clients, as shown in the exhibit below. What change will help to meet those requirements and the requirements for authenticating clients?


Question 54 - HPE6-A84 discussion

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Several AOS-CX switches are responding to SNMPv2 GET requests for the public community. The customer only permits SNMPv3. You have asked a network admin to fix this problem. The admin says, "I tried to remove the community, but the CLI output an error." What should you recommend to remediate the vulnerability and meet the customer's requirements?

A.
Enabling control plane policing to automatically drop SNMP GET requests
Answers
A.
Enabling control plane policing to automatically drop SNMP GET requests
B.
Setting the snmp-server settings to "snmpv3-only"
Answers
B.
Setting the snmp-server settings to "snmpv3-only"
C.
Adding an SNMP community with a long random name
Answers
C.
Adding an SNMP community with a long random name
D.
Enabling SNMPv3, which implicitly disables SNMPv1/v2
Answers
D.
Enabling SNMPv3, which implicitly disables SNMPv1/v2
Suggested answer: B

Explanation:

This is because SNMPv3 is a secure version of SNMP that provides authentication, encryption, and access control for network management. SNMPv3-only is a configuration option on AOS-CX switches that disables SNMPv1 and SNMPv2c, which are insecure versions of SNMP that use plain text community strings for authentication. By setting the snmp-server settings to "snmpv3-only", the switch will only respond to SNMPv3 requests and reject any SNMPv1 or SNMPv2c requests, thus remedying the vulnerability and meeting the customer's requirements.

A. Enabling control plane policing to automatically drop SNMP GET requests. This is not a valid recommendation because control plane policing is a feature that protects the switch from denial-ofservice (DoS) attacks by limiting the rate of traffic sent to the CPU. Control plane policing does not disable SNMPv1 or SNMPv2c, but rather applies a rate limit to all SNMP requests, regardless of the version. Moreover, control plane policing might also drop legitimate SNMP requests if they exceed the rate limit, which could affect the network management.

C. Adding an SNMP community with a long random name. This is not a valid recommendation because an SNMP community is a shared secret that acts as a password for accessing network devices using SNMPv1 or SNMPv2c. Adding an SNMP community with a long random name does not disable SNMPv1 or SNMPv2c, but rather creates another community string that can be used for authentication. Moreover, adding an SNMP community with a long random name does not improve the security of SNMPv1 or SNMPv2c, as the community string is still transmitted in plain text and can be intercepted by an attacker.

D. Enabling SNMPv3, which implicitly disables SNMPv1/v2. This is not a valid recommendation because enabling SNMPv3 does not implicitly disable SNMPv1 or SNMPv2c on AOS-CX switches. Enabling SNMPv3 only adds support for the secure version of SNMP, but does not remove support for the insecure versions. Therefore, enabling SNMPv3 alone does not remedy the vulnerability or meet the customer's requirements.

asked 16/09/2024
Nael Abal
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