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SCENARIO Please use the following to answer the next question; Jane is a U.S. citizen and a senior software engineer at California-based Jones Labs, a major software supplier to the U.S. Department of Defense and other U.S. federal agencies Jane's manager, Patrick, is a French citizen who has been living in California for over a decade. Patrick has recently begun to suspect that Jane is an insider secretly transmitting trade secrets to foreign intelligence. Unbeknownst to Patrick, the FBI has already received a hint from anonymous whistleblower, and jointly with the National Secunty Agency is investigating Jane's possible implication in a sophisticated foreign espionage campaign Ever since the pandemic. Jane has been working from home. To complete her daily tasks she uses her corporate laptop, which after each togin conspicuously provides notice that the equipment belongs to Jones Labs and may be monitored according to the enacted privacy policy and employment handbook Jane also has a corporate mobile phone that she uses strictly for business, the terms of which are defined in her employment contract and elaborated upon in her employee handbook. Both the privacy policy and the employee handbook are revised annually by a reputable California law firm specializing in privacy law. Jane also has a personal iPhone that she uses for private purposes only. Jones Labs has its primary data center in San Francisco, which is managed internally by Jones Labs engineers The secondary data center, managed by Amazon AWS. is physically located in the UK for disaster recovery purposes. Jones Labs' mobile devices backup is managed by a mid-sized mobile delense company located in Denver, which physically stores the data in Canada to reduce costs. Jones Labs MS Office documents are securely stored in a Microsoft Office 365 data Under Section 702 of F1SA. The NSA may do which of the following without a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court warrant?

Question 165 - CIPP-US discussion

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When designing contact tracing apps in relation to COVID-19 or any other diagnosed virus, all of the following privacy measures should be considered EXCEPT?

A.

Data retention.

Answers
A.

Data retention.

B.

Use limitations.

Answers
B.

Use limitations.

C.

Opt-out choice.

Answers
C.

Opt-out choice.

D.

User confidentiality.

Answers
D.

User confidentiality.

Suggested answer: C

Explanation:

Contact tracing apps are designed to help public health authorities track and contain the spread of COVID-19 or any other diagnosed virus by notifying users who have been in close contact with an infected person. However, these apps also raise privacy concerns, as they collect and process sensitive personal data, such as health status and location information. Therefore, contact tracing apps should follow the principles of privacy by design and default, which means that they should incorporate privacy measures into their development and operation, and offer the highest level of privacy protection to users.

Some of the privacy measures that should be considered when designing contact tracing apps are:

Data retention: Contact tracing apps should only retain the personal data they collect for as long as necessary to achieve their public health purpose, and delete or anonymize the data afterwards. Data retention periods should be clearly communicated to users and based on scientific evidence and legal requirements.

Use limitations: Contact tracing apps should only use the personal data they collect for the specific and legitimate purpose of contact tracing, and not for any other purposes, such as commercial, law enforcement, or surveillance. Use limitations should be enforced by technical and organizational measures, such as encryption, access controls, and audits.

User confidentiality: Contact tracing apps should protect the confidentiality of users' personal data and identity, and not disclose them to third parties without their consent or legal authorization. User confidentiality should be ensured by technical and organizational measures, such as pseudonymization, aggregation, and data minimization.

Opt-out choice, on the other hand, is not a privacy measure that should be considered when designing contact tracing apps, as it would undermine their effectiveness and public health objective. Contact tracing apps rely on voluntary participation and widespread adoption by users to function properly and achieve their purpose. Therefore, offering users the option to opt out of the app or certain features, such as data sharing or notifications, would reduce the app's coverage and accuracy, and potentially expose users and others to greater health risks. Instead of opt-out choice, contact tracing apps should provide users with clear and transparent information about how the app works, what data it collects and how it uses it, what benefits and risks it entails, and what rights and controls users have over their data. This way, users can make an informed and voluntary decision to use the app or not, based on their own preferences and values.

[IAPP CIPP/US Study Guide], Chapter 2: Privacy by Design and Default, pp. 35-36.

[IAPP CIPP/US Body of Knowledge], Section II: Limits on Private-sector Collection and Use of Data, Subsection B: Privacy by Design, pp. 9-10.

[IAPP Glossary], Terms: Contact Tracing, Privacy by Design, Privacy by Default.

asked 22/11/2024
Geetanjali Singh
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