Isaca CISM Practice Test - Questions Answers, Page 35

Conducting a business impact analysis (BIA) is the first step when creating an organization's disaster recovery plan (DRP) because it helps to identify and prioritize the critical business functions or processes that need to be restored after a disruption, and determine their recovery time objectives (RTOs) and recovery point objectives (RPOs)2. Identifying the response and recovery teams is not the first step, but rather a subsequent step that involves assigning roles and responsibilities for executing the DRP. Reviewing the communications plan is not the first step, but rather a subsequent step that involves defining the communication channels and protocols for notifying and updating the stakeholders during and after a disruption.Developing response and recovery strategies is not the first step, but rather a subsequent step that involves selecting and implementing the appropriate solutions and procedures for restoring the critical business functions or processes.

Reference:2https://www.isaca.org/resources/isaca-journal/issues/2018/volume-3/business-impact-analysis-bia-and-disaster-recovery-planning-drp

Including the impact of the risk as part of regular metrics is the best way for the information security manager to help senior management understand the related risk of having many user workstations with unpatched versions of software because it quantifies and communicates the potential consequences and likelihood of such a risk in terms of business objectives and performance indicators. Recommending the security steering committee conduct a review is not a good way because it does not provide any specific information or analysis about the risk or its impact. Updating the risk assessment at regular intervals is not a good way because it does not ensure that senior management is aware or informed about the risk or its impact. Sending regular notifications directly to senior managers is not a good way because it may be perceived as intrusive or annoying, and may not convey the severity or urgency of the risk or its impact.

Reference: https://www.isaca.org/resources/isaca-journal/issues/2015/volume-6/measuring-the-value-of-information-security-investments https://www.isaca.org/resources/isaca-journal/issues/2017/volume-3/how-to-measure-the-effectiveness-of-your-information-security-management-system

Conducting a meeting to capture lessons learned is the next step after an incident management team leader sends out a notification that the organization has successfully recovered from a cyberattack because it helps to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the current incident response plan, capture the feedback and recommendations from the incident responders and stakeholders, and implement the necessary improvements and corrective actions for future incidents. Preparing an executive summary for senior management is not the next step, but rather a subsequent step that involves reporting the incident details, impact, and resolution to the senior management. Gathering feedback on business impact is not the next step, but rather a concurrent step that involves assessing the extent and severity of the damage or disruption caused by the incident. Securing and preserving digital evidence for analysis is not the next step, but rather a previous step that involves collecting and documenting the relevant data or artifacts related to the incident.

Reference: https://www.isaca.org/resources/isaca-journal/issues/2017/volume-5/incident-response-lessons-learned https://www.isaca.org/resources/isaca-journal/issues/2018/volume-3/incident-response-lessons-learned

The contribution of recovery point objective (RPO) to disaster recovery is to define backup strategy because it determines the maximum amount of data loss that is acceptable to an organization after a disruption, and guides the frequency and type of backups needed to restore the data to a usable format1.Minimize outage periods is not a contribution of RPO, but rather a contribution of recovery time objective (RTO), which defines the maximum amount of time that is acceptable to restore normal operations after a disruption2.Eliminate single points of failure is not a contribution of RPO, but rather a goal of high availability (HA), which ensures that systems or services are continuously operational and resilient3.Reduce mean time between failures (MTBF) is not a contribution of RPO, but rather a measure of reliability, which indicates the average time that a system or component operates without failure4.

Reference:1https://www.druva.com/glossary/what-is-a-recovery-point-objective-definition-and-related-faqs2https://www.druva.com/glossary/what-is-a-recovery-time-objective-definition-and-related-faqs3https://www.fortinet.com/resources/cyberglossary/high-availability4https://www.fortinet.com/resources/cyberglossary/mean-time-between-failures

Updating details within the risk register is the next step for the information security manager to do after senior management has accepted the risk of noncompliance with a new regulation because it records and communicates the risk status, impact, and response strategy to the relevant stakeholders. Reporting the decision to the compliance officer is not the next step, but rather a possible subsequent step that involves informing and consulting with the compliance officer about the risk acceptance and its implications. Reassessing the organization's risk tolerance is not the next step, but rather a possible subsequent step that involves reviewing and adjusting the organization's risk appetite and thresholds based on the risk acceptance and its implications. Assessing the impact of the regulation is not the next step, but rather a previous step that involves analyzing and evaluating the potential consequences and likelihood of noncompliance with the regulation.

Reference: https://www.isaca.org/resources/isaca-journal/issues/2016/volume-6/how-to-measure-the-effectiveness-of-information-security-using-iso-27004 https://www.isaca.org/resources/isaca-journal/issues/2017/volume-3/how-to-measure-the-effectiveness-of-your-information-security-management-system

The primary goal of the eradication phase in an incident response process is to remove the threat and restore affected systems because it eliminates any traces or remnants of malicious activity or compromise from the systems or network, and returns them to their normal or secure state. Maintaining a strict chain of custody is not a goal of the eradication phase, but rather a requirement for preserving and documenting digital evidence throughout the incident response process. Providing effective triage and containment of the incident is not a goal of the eradication phase, but rather a goal of the containment phase, which isolates and stops the spread of malicious activity or compromise. Obtaining forensic evidence from the affected system is not a goal of the eradication phase, but rather a goal of the identification phase, which collects and analyzes data or artifacts related to malicious activity or compromise.

Reference: https://www.isaca.org/resources/isaca-journal/issues/2017/volume-5/incident-response-lessons-learned https://www.isaca.org/resources/isaca-journal/issues/2018/volume-3/incident-response-lessons-learned

Ignored alert messages could have been prevented by conducting regular incident response testing because it would have ensured that the help desk staff are familiar with and trained on how to handle different types of alert messages from different sources, and how to escalate them appropriately. The server being compromised could not have been prevented by conducting regular incident response testing because it is related to security vulnerabilities or weaknesses in the server configuration or authentication mechanisms. The brute force attack could not have been prevented by conducting regular incident response testing because it is related to security threats or attacks from external sources. Stolen data could not have been prevented by conducting regular incident response testing because it is related to security breaches or incidents that may occur despite the incident response plan or process.

Reference: https://www.isaca.org/resources/isaca-journal/issues/2017/volume-5/incident-response-lessons-learned https://www.isaca.org/resources/isaca-journal/issues/2018/volume-3/incident-response-lessons-learned

Integrating security activities within the development process is the best option to lower the cost to implement application security controls because it ensures that security is considered and addressed throughout the software development life cycle (SDLC), from design to deployment, and reduces the likelihood and impact of security flaws or vulnerabilities that may require costly fixes or patches later on. Performing security tests in the development environment is not the best option because it may not detect or prevent all security issues that may arise in different environments or scenarios. Performing a risk analysis after project completion is not a good option because it may be too late to identify or mitigate security risks that may have been introduced during the project. Including standard application security requirements is not a good option because it may not account for specific or unique security needs or challenges of different applications or projects.

Reference: https://www.isaca.org/resources/isaca-journal/issues/2017/volume-2/secure-software-development-lifecycle https://www.isaca.org/resources/isaca-journal/issues/2016/volume-4/technical-security-standards-for-information-systems

Ensuring security requirements are defined at the request-for-proposal (RFP) stage is the most effective security outcome in an organization's contract management process because it establishes and communicates the security expectations and obligations for both parties, and enables the organization to evaluate and select the most suitable and secure vendor or service provider. Performing vendor security benchmark analyses at the RFP stage is not an effective security outcome, but rather a possible security activity that involves comparing and ranking different vendors or service providers based on their security capabilities or performance. Extending security assessment to cover asset disposal on contract termination is not an effective security outcome, but rather a possible security activity that involves verifying and validating that any assets or data belonging to the organization are securely disposed of by the vendor or service provider at the end of the contract. Extending security assessment to include random penetration testing is not an effective security outcome, but rather a possible security activity that involves testing and auditing the vendor's or service provider's security controls or systems at random intervals during the contract.

Reference: https://www.isaca.org/resources/isaca-journal/issues/2017/volume-1/data-ownership-and-custodianship-in-the-cloud https://www.isaca.org/resources/isaca-journal/issues/2016/volume-4/integrating-assurance-functions