IAPP CIPP-US Practice Test - Questions Answers, Page 17

The state UDAP statute, which stands for Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices, is a law that protects consumers from unfair or deceptive business practices. In this case, the employer's failure to protect the employee's personal information from a phishing attack could be considered an unfair or deceptive act or practice that harmed the employee. The employee could sue the employer under the state UDAP statute for damages, injunctive relief, or other remedies. The other options are not relevant to this scenario, as they deal with different aspects of data protection, such as confidentiality, access, or destruction of personal information.Reference:

[IAPP CIPP/US Study Guide], Chapter 8, Section 8.3.1, page 227

IAPP CIPP/US Practice Questions, Question 153, page 13

The UK company can ensure an adequate level of data protection for the restricted data transfer to the US parent company by using the EU Standard Contractual Clauses (SCCs), which are contractual terms that provide safeguards for personal data transferred from the UK to third countries. The UK GDPR recognizes the validity of the EU SCCs adopted before the end of the Brexit transition period, and allows the UK Information Commissioner's Office (ICO) to issue new SCCs in the future. The other options are not correct because:

A . Signing up to an approved code of conduct under the UK GDPR is not sufficient to ensure an adequate level of data protection for restricted transfers, as it is not a transfer mechanism on its own. The UK company would still need to use another appropriate safeguard, such as SCCs or Binding Corporate Rules (BCRs), to transfer personal data to the US parent company.

C . Submitting a new application for the UK BCRs is not necessary, as the UK GDPR recognizes the existing authorized EU BCRs as valid for restricted transfers from the UK. The UK company can continue to rely on its EU BCRs, as long as they are updated to reflect the UK GDPR requirements and the role of the ICO as the competent supervisory authority.

D . Allowing each employee the option to opt-out to the restricted transfer is not a valid transfer mechanism under the UK GDPR, as it does not provide adequate safeguards for the personal data of the employees. The UK company would need to obtain the explicit consent of each employee for the restricted transfer, which must be freely given, specific, informed, and unambiguous.Reference:

UK GDPR, Chapter V, Article 46

UK GDPR, Chapter V, Article 47

UK GDPR, Chapter V, Article 49

ICO guidance on international transfers

IAPP CIPP/US Study Guide, Chapter 10, Section 10.3.2

The Virginia Consumer Data Protection Act (VCDPA) is a state law that provides comprehensive privacy rights and obligations for consumers and businesses in Virginia. The VCDPA applies to any entity that conducts business in Virginia or produces products or services that are targeted to residents of Virginia and that either: (a) controls or processes personal data of at least 100,000 consumers; or (b) controls or processes personal data of at least 25,000 consumers and derives over 50% of gross revenue from the sale of personal data. However, the VCDPA also provides several exemptions for certain types of entities and data, including an entity exemption for financial institutions or data subject to the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA). This means that organizations that are regulated by the GLBA are not subject to the VCDPA, regardless of the type or source of data they collect or process. The GLBA is a federal law that regulates the collection, use, and disclosure of personal financial information by financial institutions and their affiliates. The GLBA applies to any business that is significantly engaged in financial activities, such as banks, credit unions, securities firms, insurance companies, and certain fintech companies. The GLBA requires financial institutions to provide notice and choice to consumers about their privacy practices, to safeguard the security and confidentiality of consumer information, and to limit the sharing of consumer information with third parties. The GLBA also preempts state laws only to the extent that they are inconsistent with the GLBA, unless the state law provides greater protection to consumers.

The other state laws listed in the question do not have an entity exemption for organizations subject to the GLBA, but they may have partial or data exemptions for certain types of information that are regulated by the GLBA. For example, the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) and the California Privacy Rights Act (CPRA) are state laws that provide comprehensive privacy rights and obligations for consumers and businesses in California. The CCPA and the CPRA apply to any business that collects or sells the personal information of California residents and that meets one or more of the following thresholds: (a) has annual gross revenues in excess of $25 million; (b) alone or in combination, annually buys, receives for the business's commercial purposes, sells, or shares for commercial purposes, the personal information of 50,000 or more consumers, households, or devices; or derives 50% or more of its annual revenues from selling consumers' personal information. However, the CCPA and the CPRA also provide several exemptions for certain types of entities and data, including a data exemption for personal information collected, processed, sold, or disclosed pursuant to the GLBA, if it is in conflict with the GLBA. This means that information that is subject to the GLBA is exempt from the privacy requirements of the CCPA and the CPRA, but not from the data breach liability provisions. The CCPA and the CPRA do not exempt financial institutions or other entities that are regulated by the GLBA from their scope, unless they only collect or process information that is subject to the GLBA.

The Nevada Privacy Law is a state law that provides privacy rights and obligations for consumers and operators of websites or online services in Nevada. The Nevada Privacy Law applies to any person who owns or operates an Internet website or online service for commercial purposes that collects and maintains covered information from consumers who reside in Nevada and use or visit the Internet website or online service. Covered information includes any one or more of the following items of personally identifiable information about a consumer collected by an operator through an Internet website or online service and maintained by the operator in an accessible form: (a) a first and last name; (b) a home or other physical address which includes the name of a street and the name of a city or town; an electronic mail address; (d) a telephone number; (e) a social security number; (f) an identifier that allows a specific person to be contacted either physically or online; or (g) any other information concerning a person collected from the person through the Internet website or online service of the operator and maintained by the operator in combination with an identifier in a form that makes the information personally identifiable. However, the Nevada Privacy Law also provides several exemptions for certain types of entities and data, including a data exemption for any data that is subject to the GLBA. This means that information that is regulated by the GLBA is exempt from the Nevada Privacy Law, regardless of the type or source of data. The Nevada Privacy Law does not exempt financial institutions or other entities that are subject to the GLBA from its scope, unless they only collect or process information that is subject to the GLBA.Reference:

VCDPA, Section 59.1-572 (A) (1)

GLBA, 15 U.S.C. 6801 et seq.

CCPA, Section 1798.145 (e)

CPRA, Section 1798.121

Nevada Privacy Law, Section 603A.340 (1) (a)

Contact tracing apps are designed to help public health authorities track and contain the spread of COVID-19 or any other diagnosed virus by notifying users who have been in close contact with an infected person. However, these apps also raise privacy concerns, as they collect and process sensitive personal data, such as health status and location information. Therefore, contact tracing apps should follow the principles of privacy by design and default, which means that they should incorporate privacy measures into their development and operation, and offer the highest level of privacy protection to users.

Some of the privacy measures that should be considered when designing contact tracing apps are:

Data retention: Contact tracing apps should only retain the personal data they collect for as long as necessary to achieve their public health purpose, and delete or anonymize the data afterwards. Data retention periods should be clearly communicated to users and based on scientific evidence and legal requirements.

Use limitations: Contact tracing apps should only use the personal data they collect for the specific and legitimate purpose of contact tracing, and not for any other purposes, such as commercial, law enforcement, or surveillance. Use limitations should be enforced by technical and organizational measures, such as encryption, access controls, and audits.

User confidentiality: Contact tracing apps should protect the confidentiality of users' personal data and identity, and not disclose them to third parties without their consent or legal authorization. User confidentiality should be ensured by technical and organizational measures, such as pseudonymization, aggregation, and data minimization.

Opt-out choice, on the other hand, is not a privacy measure that should be considered when designing contact tracing apps, as it would undermine their effectiveness and public health objective. Contact tracing apps rely on voluntary participation and widespread adoption by users to function properly and achieve their purpose. Therefore, offering users the option to opt out of the app or certain features, such as data sharing or notifications, would reduce the app's coverage and accuracy, and potentially expose users and others to greater health risks. Instead of opt-out choice, contact tracing apps should provide users with clear and transparent information about how the app works, what data it collects and how it uses it, what benefits and risks it entails, and what rights and controls users have over their data. This way, users can make an informed and voluntary decision to use the app or not, based on their own preferences and values.

[IAPP CIPP/US Study Guide], Chapter 2: Privacy by Design and Default, pp. 35-36.

[IAPP CIPP/US Body of Knowledge], Section II: Limits on Private-sector Collection and Use of Data, Subsection B: Privacy by Design, pp. 9-10.

[IAPP Glossary], Terms: Contact Tracing, Privacy by Design, Privacy by Default.

Patrick should first ensure that inspecting GPS geolocation data from Jane's corporate mobile phone is permitted under Jane's employment contract or the company's employee privacy policy. This is because Jane has a reasonable expectation of privacy in her location information, even if she uses a corporate-owned device for business purposes. The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures by the government, and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) prohibits unauthorized interception or access to electronic communications by private parties. Therefore, Patrick cannot inspect Jane's GPS data without a valid legal basis, such as consent, contract, or court order. Obtaining prior consent from Jane pursuant to the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (A) is not relevant, as this law regulates unsolicited calls and text messages, not location tracking. Revising emerging workplace privacy best practices with a reputable advocacy organization (B) is not sufficient, as Patrick still needs to comply with the existing legal obligations and contractual terms. Obtaining a subpoena from law enforcement, or a court order, directing Jones Labs to collect the GPS geolocation data is not necessary, as Patrick is not acting on behalf of the government or in response to a legal request. However, if Patrick does obtain such a legal order, he should also comply with it and notify Jane of the disclosure, unless prohibited by law.Reference:

IAPP CIPP/US Study Guide, Chapter 4, Section 4.1.2, p. 115-116

IAPP CIPP/US Study Guide, Chapter 4, Section 4.2.1, p. 118-119

IAPP CIPP/US Study Guide, Chapter 4, Section 4.2.2, p. 120-121

IAPP CIPP/US Study Guide, Chapter 4, Section 4.2.3, p. 122-123

IAPP CIPP/US Study Guide, Chapter 4, Section 4.3.1, p. 124-125

IAPP CIPP/US Study Guide, Chapter 4, Section 4.3.2, p. 126-127

IAPP CIPP/US Study Guide, Chapter 4, Section 4.3.3, p. 128-129

IAPP CIPP/US Study Guide, Chapter 4, Section 4.3.4, p. 130-131

IAPP CIPP/US Study Guide, Chapter 4, Section 4.3.5, p. 132-133

IAPP CIPP/US Study Guide, Chapter 4, Section 4.3.6, p. 134-135

IAPP CIPP/US Study Guide, Chapter 4, Section 4.3.7, p. 136-137

IAPP CIPP/US Study Guide, Chapter 4, Section 4.3.8, p. 138-139

IAPP CIPP/US Study Guide, Chapter 4, Section 4.3.9, p. 140-141

IAPP CIPP/US Study Guide, Chapter 4, Section 4.3.10, p. 142-143

IAPP CIPP/US Study Guide, Chapter 4, Section 4.3.11, p. 144-145

IAPP CIPP/US Study Guide, Chapter 4, Section 4.3.12, p. 146-147

IAPP CIPP/US Study Guide, Chapter 4, Section 4.3.13, p. 148-149

IAPP CIPP/US Study Guide, Chapter 4, Section 4.3.14, p. 150-151

IAPP CIPP/US Study Guide, Chapter 4, Section 4.3.15, p. 152-153

IAPP CIPP/US Study Guide, Chapter 4, Section 4.3.16, p. 154-155

IAPP CIPP/US Study Guide, Chapter 4, Section 4.3.17, p. 156-157

According to the IAPP CIPP/US study guide, the first priority after a breach has been confirmed is to notify the affected individuals, regulators, and other stakeholders as required by law or contract. This is to allow them to take steps to protect themselves from potential harm, such as identity theft, fraud, or reputational damage. Providing timely and accurate notice also helps to mitigate legal liability, preserve customer trust, and comply with applicable laws and regulations. The other tasks are also important, but they are not the immediate priority after a breach has been established.Reference:IAPP CIPP/US study guide, Chapter 6, Section 6.4.2, page 211.

According to HIPAA, a business associate is a person or entity that performs certain functions or activities that involve the use or disclosure of protected health information (PHI) on behalf of, or provides services to, a covered entity. A business associate agreement (BAA) is a written contract between a covered entity and a business associate that establishes the permitted and required uses and disclosures of PHI by the business associate, as well as the safeguards that the business associate must implement to protect the PHI. In this scenario, MedApps is a business associate of Miraculous, since it provides a telehealth app that involves the use or disclosure of PHI on behalf of Miraculous. Therefore, HIPAA would require Miraculous and MedApps to enter into a BAA before using the telehealth app. The other options are incorrect because HIPAA does not prohibit the use of cloud hosting services or the hosting of in-person appointment data in the cloud, as long as the appropriate safeguards and agreements are in place. HIPAA also does not require patient consent for the sharing of PHI with third parties for treatment, payment, or health care operations purposes, which would include the use of the telehealth app.Reference:

HIPAA and Telehealth- Office for Civil Rights

HIPAA Rules for telehealth technology- Telehealth.HHS.gov

Notification of Enforcement Discretion for Telehealth- Office for Civil Rights

Guidance: How the HIPAA Rules Permit Covered Health Care Providers and Health Plans to Provide Audio-Only Telehealth- Office for Civil Rights

HIPAA Compliant App- Telehealth.org

IAPP CIPP/US Certified Information Privacy Professional Study Guide - Chapter 3: HIPAA and HITECH, pages 75-76, 81-82, 86-87.

A data ethics framework is a set of principles and guidelines that help organizations ensure that their data practices are ethical, responsible, and trustworthy.According to the IAPP CIPP/US Study Guide, some of the key components of a data ethics framework are1:

Data governance: the policies, processes, and standards that govern how data is collected, used, stored, and shared within an organization.

Preferability testing: the process of assessing the potential impacts and risks of data-driven solutions on stakeholders, such as customers, employees, and society.

Auditing: the process of monitoring, reviewing, and verifying the compliance and performance of data practices against the established ethical standards and legal requirements. Automated decision-making, on the other hand, is not a key component of a data ethics framework, but rather a data practice that may raise ethical issues and challenges.Automated decision-making refers to the use of algorithms, artificial intelligence, or machine learning to make decisions or recommendations without human intervention2.While automated decision-making can offer benefits such as efficiency, accuracy, and consistency, it can also pose risks such as bias, discrimination, lack of transparency, and accountability3. Therefore, automated decision-making should be subject to ethical evaluation and oversight, but it is not itself a part of a data ethics framework.Reference:

[IAPP CIPP/US Study Guide], Chapter 10, Section 10.4, page 287

[IAPP Glossary], Automated Decision-Making

IAPP Resources, Ethical Data Use and Automated Decision-Making: A Practical Guide

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is the primary federal agency that enforces consumer privacy and data security laws in the United States. The FTC has the authority to bring enforcement actions against businesses that engage in unfair or deceptive acts or practices that affect commerce, under Section 5 of the FTC Act. Unfair acts or practices are those that cause or are likely to cause substantial injury to consumers that is not reasonably avoidable by consumers and is not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or competition. Deceptive acts or practices are those that involve a material representation, omission, or practice that is likely to mislead consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances.

The FTC's action against B.J.'s Wholesale Club in 2005 was unique because it was based on matters of fairness rather than deception. The FTC alleged that B.J.'s Wholesale Club, a retailer that operates warehouse stores and gas stations, failed to provide reasonable security for the sensitive information of its customers, such as name, card number, and expiration date, that it collected from the magnetic stripes of credit and debit cards. The FTC claimed that this information was used by unauthorized persons to make millions of dollars of fraudulent purchases. The FTC did not allege that B.J.'s Wholesale Club made any false or misleading statements or omissions about its data security practices, but rather that its failure to take appropriate security measures was an unfair practice that violated Section 5 of the FTC Act. The FTC argued that B.J.'s Wholesale Club's lax security caused or was likely to cause substantial injury to consumers that was not reasonably avoidable by consumers and was not outweighed by any benefits to consumers or competition.

The FTC's action against B.J.'s Wholesale Club was one of the first cases in which the FTC used its unfairness authority to address data security issues, and it set a precedent for future enforcement actions against businesses that fail to protect consumer data. The settlement required B.J.'s Wholesale Club to implement a comprehensive information security program and obtain audits by an independent third-party security professional every other year for 20 years.Reference:

FTC Complaint, Paragraphs 1-23

FTC Agreement Containing Consent Order, Paragraphs 1-9

FTC Analysis of Proposed Consent Order to Aid Public Comment, Pages 1-3

[IAPP CIPP/US Study Guide], Pages 69-70